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Recent experimental evidence is marshalled in support of the position that man's 
limited memory, attention, and reasoning capabilities lead him to apply simple 
strain-reducing cognitive strategies for processing information when making 
judgments and decisions. These strategies portray decision processes in a manner 
quite different from traditional normative and descriptive models. In some 
situations, these strategies may produce good decisions; in others, they may 
lead to serious mistakes. Relevance of these findings for important "real-world" 
(i.e., non-laboratory) decisions is discussed. 
 
"What a piece of work is man. 
How noble in reason, how infinite in 
faculties, in form and moving how 
express and admirable, in action 
how like an angel. In apprehension how like 
a god. The beauty of the world, 
the paragon of animals. " 
 
William Shakespeare 
 
I. Introduction 
The general question that I wish to discuss today is whether man is capable of 
the kind of high-level information processing that is required for decision 
making in today's world. 
 
 The title of this paper was suggested by one of my favorite posters. It 
shows an individual in a gas mask surrounded by a cloud of polluted air, 
symbolic of the troubles that plague modern man. Adjacent to this picture is the 
quote from Shakespeare presented above. The poster obviously takes issue with 
Shakespeare's optimistic assessment of human intelligence—to the effect that we 
are noble in reason and infinite in faculties. I suspect that the designer of 
the poster would agree more with the following statement by another student of 
behavior, Herbert Simon: 
 
"The capacity of the human mind for formu- 
lating and solving complex problems is very 
small compared with the size of the problems 
whose solution is required for objectively 
rational behavior in the real world—or even 
for a reasonable approximation to such objec- 
tive rationality [Simon, 1957; p. 198]." 
 
 Simon has long been skeptical about human intellectual capabilities. More 
than a decade and a half ago he proposed the principle of bounded rationality to 
describe man's limited capacity for rational thinking. He said, 
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" . . . the first consequence of the principle of 
bounded rationality is that the intended rationality 
of an actor requires him to construct a simplified 
model of the real situation in order to deal with 
it. He behaves rationally with respect to this 
model, and such behavior is not even approximately 
optimal with respect to the real world. To pre- 
dict his behavior we must understand the way in 
which this simplified model is constructed, and 
its construction will certainly be related to his 
psychological properties as a perceiving, thinking, 
and learning animal [Simon, 1957; p. 198]." 
 
 Simon's thinking about bounded rationality has been stimulated by basic 
psychological research in such areas as learning, memory, and perception. It is 
tempting to seek additional support for bounded rationality by pointing to the 
many catastrophes around us. For example, one can note that urban renewal 
programs have actually reduced the supply of low-cost housing in the U.S., that 
flood control measures have led to an increase in the yearly toll of flood 
damages, or that expressways have often added to traffic congestion instead of 
reducing it. However, these issues are quite complex and the role that improper 
information processing plays in the failure of our best-intended decisions 
remains unclear. 
 
 As an experimental psychologist, my own interest is in laboratory 
experiments that are designed to test various hypotheses about bounded 
rationality. If these experiments are anything more than mere academic 
exercises, we should eventually be able to link their results to specific 
examples of suboptimal decision making in the real world. In this paper, I'll 
try to describe some of these experiments and speculate about their implications 
for important decisions. 
 
 The research on information processing to be described below is organized 
around several basic questions of concern to a decision maker. First, he wonders 
what will happen or how likely it is to happen, and his use of information to 
answer these questions gets him involved in processes which we call inference, 
prediction, subjective probability, and diagnosis. He must also evaluate the 
worth of objects, and this often requires him to combine information from 
several component attributes of the object into an overall judgment. Finally, he 
is called upon to integrate his opinions about probabilities and values into the 
selection of some course of action. What is referred to as "weighing risks 
against benefits" is an example of the latter combinatorial process. 
 
 One discipline that has evolved to help the decision maker answer these 
basic questions is the field of statistics. However, in most of our judgments 
and decisions, we bypass formal statistical reasoning and act, instead, as 
"intuitive statisticians." There have been a number of recent studies pertaining 
to the adequacy of man's performance as an intuitive statistician. In general, 
these studies have uncovered some surprising and rather disturbing deficiencies 
in man's ability to think in probabilistic terms or to balance risks against 
benefits when making decisions. 
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II. Biased Judgments of Uncertain Events 
Because of the importance of probabilistic reasoning to decision making, 
considerable effort has been devoted to studying how people perceive, process, 
and evaluate the probabilities of uncertain events. One basic conclusion from 
this research is that probabilistic judgments show large and consistent biases 
that are quite difficult to eliminate. 
 
Understanding Random Sampling 
The "law of small numbers." One example of man's inadequacy as an 
intuitive statistician comes from a study by Tversky and Kahneman (197la), who 
analyzed the kinds of decisions psychologists make when planning their 
scientific experiments. Despite extensive formal training in statistics, 
psychologists usually rely upon their educated intuitions when they make their 
decisions about how large a sample of data to collect or whether they should 
repeat an experiment to make sure their results are reliable. 
 
After questioning a number of psychologists about their research practices 
and after studying the designs of experiments reported in psychological 
journals, Tversky and Kahneman concluded that these scientists had seriously 
incorrect notions about the amount of error and unreliability inherent in small 
samples of data. They found that the typical psychologist gambles his research 
hypotheses on small samples without realizing that the odds against his 
obtaining accurate results are unreasonably high; second, he has undue 
confidence in early trends from the first few data points and in the stability 
of observed patterns of data. In addition, he has unreasonably high expectations 
about the replicability of significant results. Finally, he rarely attributes a 
deviation of results from his expectations to sampling variability because he 
finds a causal explanation for any discrepancy. 
 
Tversky and Kahneman summarized these results by asserting that people's 
intuitions seemed to satisfy a "law of small numbers" which means that the "law 
of large numbers" applies to small samples as well as to large ones. The "law of 
large numbers" says that very large samples will be highly representative of the 
population from which they are drawn. For the scientists in this study, small 
samples were also expected to be highly representative of the population. Since 
his acquaintance with logic or probability theory did not make the scientist any 
less susceptible to these cognitive biases, Tversky and Kahneman concluded that 
the only effective precaution is the use of formal statistical procedures, 
rather than intuition, to design experiments and evaluate data.1 
 
In a related study, this time using Stanford University undergraduates as 
subjects, Kahneman and Tversky (in press) found that many of these subjects did 
not understand the fundamental principle of sampling, namely, the notion that 
the error in a sample becomes smaller as the sample size gets larger. To 
illustrate, consider one of the questions used in this study. 
 
"A certain town is served by two hospitals. In 
the larger hospital about 45 babies are born 
each day, and in the smaller hospital about 15 
babies are born each day. As you know, about 
50% of all babies are boys. The exact 
percentage of baby boys, however, varies from 
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day to day. Sometimes it may be higher than 
50%, sometimes lower. 
 
"For a period of one year, each hospital 
recorded the days on which more than 60% of the 
babies born were boys. Which hospital do you 
think recorded more such days? 
 
"Check one : 
 
a) The larger hospital  ______ 
 
b) The smaller hospital  ______ 
 
c) About the same (i.e., 
   # of days were within 
   5% of each other)   ______." 
 
About 24% of the subjects chose answer a, 20% chose b, and 56% selected c. The 
correct answer is, of course, b. A deviation of 10% or more from the population 
proportion is much more likely when the sample size is small. 
 
Kahneman and Tversky concluded that "the notion that sampling variance 
decreases in proportion to sample size is apparently not part of man's 
repertoire of intuitions. For anyone who would wish to view man as a reasonable 
intuitive statistician such results are discouraging." 
 
Judgments of Correlation and Causality 
Next, let's look at another facet of statistical thinking—the perception 
of correlational relationships between pairs of variables. Correlation between 
two variables means that knowledge of one will enable you to predict the value 
of the other. 
 
Chapman and Chapman (1969), studying a phenomenon they have labeled 
illusory correlation, have shown how one's prior expectation of a relationship 
between two variables can lead him to perceive correlation when it does not 
really exist. They found that most subjects learned to see what they expected to 
see even though there were no real correlations in the data they were shown. The 
Chapmans noted that in many decision situations an expert may be reinforced in 
his observations of illusory correlates by the reports of his colleagues, who 
themselves may be subject to the same illusion. Such agreement among experts is, 
unfortunately, often mistaken as evidence for the truth of the observation. 
 
Several studies have investigated subjects' perceptions of correlation and 
causality in simple situations involving just two binary variables. Consider a 2 
x 2 table in which variable A is the antecedent or input variable and B is the 
consequent or output variable and the small letters are the frequencies with 
which the levels of these variables occur together. 
 
 B1 B2 
A1 A1B1 = a A1B2 = b 
A2 A2B1 = c A2B2 = d 
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A correlation or contingency exists between A and B to the extent that the 
probability of Bl given Al differs from the probability of Bl given A2: that is, 
to the extent that a/(a + b) differs from c/(c + d). If Bl is as likely to occur 
given A2 as it is given Al, there is no correlation between A and B. 
 
Research indicates that subjects' judgments of contingency are not based 
on a comparison of a/(a + b) versus c/(c + d). For example, Smedslund (1963) had 
students of nursing judge the relation between a symptom and the diagnosis of a 
disease. He found that the judgments were based mainly on the frequency of joint 
occurrence of symptom and disease (cell a in the matrix), without taking the 
other three event combinations into account. As a result, the judgments were 
unrelated to actual contingency. Similar results were obtained by Jenkins and 
Ward (1965) and Ward and Jenkins (1965). Ward and Jenkins concluded: 
 
"In general . . . statistically naive subjects 
lack an abstract concept of contingency that is 
isomorphic with the statistical concept. Those who 
receive information on a trial by trial basis, as it 
usually occurs in the real world, generally fail to 
assess adequately the degree of relationship present 
[p. 240].” 
 
A recent example in the newspaper illustrates several of the biases 
described above. A woman asked Abigail Van Buren the following question: "Dear 
Abby: Why do so many people say that marijuana is harmless? Our daughter began 
using it in January. She went on to mescaline in March, and was in a mental 
hospital in July." Abby replied that marijuana apparently can be destructive to 
some individuals and there is no way of knowing who can handle it and who 
cannot. 
 
Thus we see that the woman who asked the question and Abby were both 
drawing an inference about the relationship between marijuana and later problems 
on the basis of a very small sample (1 case) that fell in cell a of the 2 x 2 
table shown above. 
 
Heuristic Devices for Probability Estimation and Intuitive Prediction 
Several recent experiments by Kahneman and Tversky help demonstrate the 
kinds of heuristic devices for processing information that exemplify the 
struggle of a bounded intellect to cope with problems of uncertainty. 
 
Availability bias in judgments of probability. The first heuristic is the 
use of "mental effort" or "mental availability" to evaluate probability. Tversky 
and Kahneman (1971b) found that one cue that we use when judging the probability 
of an event is the ease with which relevant instances of that event are 
imagined. Another cue is the number of such instances that are readily 
remembered. The availability of instances is affected by factors such as recency 
and imaginability, which may, but need not, bear any relation to the event's 
probability. For example, the letter k is three times as likely to appear as the 
third letter of an English word as the first letter, yet most persons judge it 
as more likely to be a first letter. Tversky and Kahneman hypothesize that, when 
people make this judgment, they try to think of words either beginning with k or 
having k as a third letter. It is easier to think of words that begin with k, 
and if we use that fact as a cue on which to base our intuitive probability 
estimates, these words will be perceived as more probable than words with k in 
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the third position. In general, the harder it is to recall or imagine instances 
of an event, the lower the judged probability of that event. 
 
Dominance of individuating information in intuitive prediction. A second 
general heuristic for making judgments about uncertain events is a rather 
complicated device which Kahneman and Tversky (1972a,b) have called 
representativeness. Although representativeness manifests itself in many 
judgmental settings, we shall consider only one example—a problem of intuitive 
prediction studied by Kahneman and Tversky (1972b). The task was to judge the  
likelihood that an individual, Tom W. , is a graduate student in a particular 
field of specialization. The judges in this study were all graduate students in 
psychology. The only information they had available to them was the following 
brief description written several years earlier by a psychologist on the basis 
of some projective tests: 
 
"Tom W. is of high intelligence. although 
lacking in true creativity. He has a need for 
order and clarity, and for neat and tidy systems 
in which every detail finds its appropriate 
place. His writing is rather dull and mechanical, 
occasionally enlivened by somewhat corny puns and 
by flashes of imagination of the sci-fi type. He 
has a strong drive for competence. He seems to 
have little feel and little sympathy for other 
people, and does not enjoy interacting with 
others. Self-centered, he nonetheless has a 
deep moral sense. 
 
"Tom W. is currently a graduate student. 
Please rank the following nine fields of graduate 
specialization in order of the likelihood that 
Tom W. is now a student in that field. Let rank 
1 be the most probable choice.” 
 
______   Business Administration 
______   Computer Sciences 
______   Engineering 
______   Humanities and Education 
______   Law 
______   Library Sciences 
______   Medicine 
______   Physical and Life Sciences 
______   Social Science and Social Work 
 
In this particular study. the representativeness hypothesis predicted that 
people should rank the graduate programs on the basis of the similarity between 
the brief description and a typical student in each program. This is exactly 
what happened. Ratings of similarity and ratings of likelihood coincided almost 
exactly. What was remarkable here is that the prior probabilities, as determined 
by the base rates for these graduate programs, had no influence whatsoever upon 
the judgments. Computer Sciences and Engineering were judged to be the most 
probable fields for Tom W., even though these fields have relatively few 
students in them. This is especially surprising considering the fact that the 
judges recognized the thumbnail personality sketch as having little or no 
validity. In addition, all of these judges had been exposed to the notion of 
base-rate prediction in their statistical training, and they used the base rate 
in a condition where no other information was provided. The important result 
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here is the apparent inability of subjects to integrate the similarity ordering 
with the base-rate information in a situation where base rate should have been 
predominant. In other words, the judges knew the description was of low validity 
and they knew that base rates differed, yet they were unable to put this 
knowledge into practice. As a result, their judgments did not properly reflect 
their underlying beliefs. 
 
III. Problems in Integrating Information from Multiple Sources 
The study just described illustrates the inability of judges to blend base 
rate information with individuating information in a problem of prediction. 
Next, I'd like to consider the integration of diverse sources of information 
into an overall judgment of worth or a decision about a course of action. Here, 
too, we find that difficulties in integrating information lead people to make 
judgments that are inconsistent with their underlying values and opinions. 
 
The failure of one's decisions to appropriately reflect his personal values can 
be considered one of the most fundamental aspects of non-optimal decision 
making. One example of this comes from an experiment by Slovic and Lichtenstein 
(1968a). In this study, subjects were asked to indicate how much they would like 
to play various gambles. The attributes of the gambles, which had to be 
integrated into the overall judgment, were the gambles' probabilities of winning 
and losing and the winning and losing payoffs. The experiment was 
straightforward. One group of subjects rated the attractiveness of playing each 
gamble on a ten-point scale. A second group of subjects indicated the 
attractiveness of these same gambles by a method in which they put a price tag 
on each to indicate its worth to them. That is, they stated an amount of money 
such that they would be indifferent between playing the gamble and receiving the 
stated amount. In addition, some of the subjects in both of these groups 
indicated their subjective weightings for the four attributes of a gamble (i.e., 
probability of winning, probability of losing, amount to win, and amount to 
lose) by distributing 100 points over the set of attributes according to their 
feelings about the relative importance of each dimension. When subjects rated 
the attractiveness of a gamble, probability of winning was found to be the most 
important dimension. When they put a price on a gamble, attractiveness was 
determined by the gamble's payoffs. Yet subjects in both groups stated that they 
valued probability of winning as the most important attribute. Apparently, there 
was a failure to give proper consideration to this value when making the pricing 
responses. 
 
Two later experiments (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971; 1972), one of which 
was conducted on the floor of the Four Queens Casino in Las Vegas, demonstrated 
a similar response-mode effect. Consider the following pair of gambles used in 
the Las Vegas experiment: 
 
Bet A      Bet B 
 
11/12 chance to win 12 chips   2/12 chance to win 79 chips 
 
1/12 chance to win 24 chips   10/12 chance to lose 5 chips 
 
where each chip could represent either 10¢, 25¢, $1, or $5. 
 
Notice that Bet A has a much better chance of winning but Bet B offers a higher 
winning payoff. Subjects were shown many such pairs of bets. They were asked to 
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indicate, in two ways, how much they would like to play each bet in a pair. 
First they made a simple choice, A or B. Later they were asked to assume they 
owned a ticket to play each bet, and they were to state the lowest price for 
which they would sell this ticket. 
 
Presumably these selling prices and choices are both governed by the same 
underlying quality, the subjective attractiveness of each gamble.2 Therefore, 
the subject should state a higher selling price for the gamble that he prefers 
in the choice situation. However, the results indicated that subjects often 
chose one gamble, yet stated a higher selling price for the other gamble. For 
the particular pair of gambles shown above, Bets A and B were chosen about 
equally often. However, Bet B received a higher selling price about 88% of the 
time. Of the subjects who chose Bet A, 87% gave a higher selling price to Bet B, 
thus exhibiting an inconsistent preference pattern. 
 
What accounts for the inconsistent pattern of preferences among almost 
half the subjects? We have traced it to the fact that subjects use different 
cognitive strategies for setting prices than for making choices. Subjects choose 
Bet A because of its good odds, but they set a higher price for B because of its 
large winning payoff. Because the responses are inconsistent, it is obvious that 
at least one kind of response does not accurately reflect what the decision 
maker believes to be the most important attribute in a gamble. 
 
A "compatibility" effect seems to be operating here. Since a selling price 
is expressed in terms of monetary units, subjects apparently found it easier to 
use the monetary aspects of the gamble to produce this type of response. Such a 
bias did not exist with the choices since each attribute of one gamble could be 
directly compared with the same attribute of the other gamble. With no reason to 
use payoffs as a starting point, subjects were free to use any number of 
strategies to determine their choices. In many cases, they relied primarily on 
the probabilities of winning and losing. When faced with their inconsistent 
decisions, many subjects had a very hard time changing either of their 
conflicting responses. They felt that the different strategies they used for 
each decision were appropriate. However, strict adherence to an inconsistent 
pattern of prices and choices can be termed irrational, since the inconsistent 
subject can be made to become a "money pump,” easily led into purchasing and 
trading gambles in such a way that he continually loses money. 
 
The overdependence on payoff cues when pricing a gamble suggests a general 
hypothesis to the effect that the compatibility or commensurability between a 
dimension of information and the required response affects the importance of 
that information in determining the response. This hypothesis was tested in a 
recent experiment (Slovic & MacPhillamy, 1972) in which we predicted that 
dimensions common to each alternative in a choice situation would have greater 
influence upon decisions than would dimensions that were unique to a particular 
alternative. We asked subjects to compare pairs of students and predict which 
would get the higher college Grade Point Average. The subjects were given each 
student's scores on two cue dimensions (tests) on which to base their judgments. 
One dimension was common to both students and the other was unique. For example, 
Student A might be described in terms of his scores on Need for Achievement and 
Quantitative Ability, while Student B might be described by his scores on Need 
for Achievement and English Skill. In this example, since Need for Achievement 
is a dimension common to both students, it should be weighted heavily. That is, 
a comparison between two students along the same dimension should be easier, 
cognitively, than a comparison between different dimensions, and this ease of 
use should lead to greater reliance on the common dimension. The data strongly 
confirmed this hypothesis. Dimensions were weighted more heavily when common 
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than when they were unique attributes. Interrogation of the subjects after the 
experiment indicated that most did not wish to give more weight to common 
dimensions and were unaware that they had done so. 
 
The message in these experiments is that the amalgamation of different 
types of information and different types of values into an overall judgment is a 
difficult cognitive process. In our attempts to ease the strain of processing 
information, we often resort to judgmental strategies that do an injustice to 
our underlying values. 
 
IV. A Search for General Principles 
Concreteness 
Thus far, I've been describing some specific mechanisms that decision 
makers use to reduce the strain of integrating information. At present, we are 
searching for some more general principles to describe information-processing 
strategies. One such principle is the concept of "concreteness." Concreteness 
represents the general notion that a judge or decision maker tends to use only 
the information that is explicitly displayed in the stimulus object and will use 
it only in the form in which it is displayed. Information that has to be stored 
in memory, inferred from the explicit display, or transformed tends to be 
discounted or ignored. 
 
The work on cue commensurability described above is congruent with this 
hypothesis. There is evidence from the literature on problem solving that also 
suggests it, see Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin (1956, p.237), for example. 
 
The tendency to avoid transforming information prior to using that information 
is illustrated in the context of risk-taking decisions by two recent 
experiments. The first study, done by Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968b), was 
designed to test the hypothesis that the variance of outcomes in a gamble is an 
important determinant of the gamble's attractiveness. Specially-constructed 
gambles were used to manipulate variance without changing the probabilities and 
payoffs that were explicitly displayed to the subject. To illustrate this, 
Figure 1 shows a duplex bet and a standard bet that are termed parallel because 
they have the same stated probabilities and payoffs, namely .6 chance to win $2 
and .4 chance to lose $2. Imagine that the circular discs in Figure 1 have 
spinners attached to them. When the spinner points to a section of the disc you 
win or lose the amount indicated adjacent to that section. To play a duplex bet, 
one must spin a pointer on both discs. Thus, one can win and not lose, lose and 
not win, both win and lose, or neither win nor lose. The duplex and its parallel 
standard bet differ in variance. If the subject plays the standard bet, he will 
either gain or lose $2. If he plays the duplex bet, he has a fairly high 
probability of breaking even. The duplex bet, therefore, has much less variance. 
We have found that most subjects perceived duplex bets and their parallel 
standard bets as equally attractive. This suggests that the judgments are based 
only upon the explicitly stated probabilities and payoffs. The characteristics 
of the underlying distribution for the duplex bet are apparently too subtle to 
exert any significant influence. 
 
An experiment by Payne and Braunstein (1971), outlined in Figure 2, nicely 
complements the study just described. They used pairs of duplex gambles designed 
to have equal underlying distributions but different explicit probability 
values. Subjects had definite preferences for one member of such pairs over the 
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other, again demonstrating the dominance of explicit information over 
information that must be transformed before it can be operated upon. 
 
Anchoring and Adjustment 
A second general notion that seems useful in describing how humans ease 
the strain of integrating information is a process called anchoring and 
adjustment. In this process, a natural starting point is used as a first 
approximation to the judgment, an anchor so to speak. This anchor is then 
adjusted to accommodate the implications of the additional information. 
Typically, the adjustment is a crude and imprecise one which fails to do justice 
to the importance of additional information. 
 
One example of anchoring and adjustment comes from the experiment 
described earlier in which people had to attach monetary values to gambles to 
indicate the attractiveness of those gambles. We have found that, in making 
these judgments, people who find a gamble basically attractive use the amount to 
win as a natural starting point. They then adjust the amount to win downward to 
take into account the less-than-perfect chance of winning and the fact that 
there is some amount to lose as well. Typically, this adjustment is insufficient 
and that is why large winning payoffs lead people to set prices that are 
inconsistent with their choices. 
 
A second example of anchoring and adjustment comes from studies by Alpert 
and Raiffa (1968) and by Tversky and Kahneman (1972). In both of these studies, 
subjects were given "almanac questions" such as the following: 
 
"How many foreign cars were imported into the 
U.S. in 1968? 
 
(a)  Make a high estimate such that you feel 
there is only a 1% probability the true 
answer would exceed your estimate. 
 
(b) Make a low estimate such that you feel  
there is only a 1% probability the true 
answer would be below this estimate.” 
 
In essence, the subject is being asked to estimate an interval such that 
he believes there is a 98% chance that the true answer will fall within that 
interval. The spacing between his high and low estimates is his expression of 
his uncertainty about the quantity in question. We cannot say that this single 
pair of estimates is right or wrong. However, if he were to make many such 
estimates or if a large number of persons were to answer this question, we 
should expect the range between upper and lower estimates to include the truth 
about 98% of the time—if the subjective probabilities were valid. What is 
typically found, however, by Alpert and Raiffa and by Tversky and Kahneman, is 
that the 98% confidence range fails to include the true value from 40% to 50% of 
the time, across many subjects answering many kinds of almanac questions. In 
other words, subjects' confidence bands are much too narrow, given their state 
of knowledge. Alpert and Raiffa observed that this bias persisted even when 
subjects were given feedback about their overly-narrow confidence bands and 
urged to widen the bands on a new set of estimation problems. 
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These studies indicate that people believe they have a much better picture 
of the truth than they really do. Why this happens is not entirely clear. 
Tversky and Kahneman tentatively hypothesize that people approach these problems 
by searching for a calculational scheme or algorithm by which to estimate a best 
guess which they then adjust up and down to get a 98% confidence range. For 
example, in answering the above question, one might proceed as follows: 
 
“I think there were about 180 million people in 
the U.S. in 1968; there is about one car for 
every three people thus there would have been 
about 60 million cars; the lifetime of a car 
is about 10 years, this suggests that there 
should be about 6 million new cars in a year 
but since the population and the number of cars 
is increasing let's make that 9 million for 1968; 
foreign cars make up about 10% of the U.S. 
market, thus there were probably about 900,000 
foreign imports; to set my 98% confidence band, 
I'll add and subtract a few hundred thousand cars 
from my estimate of 900,000." 
 
Tversky and Kahneman argue that people's estimates assume the validity of their 
computational algorithms. However, there are two sources of uncertainty that 
plague these algorithms. First, there is uncertainty associated with every step 
in the algorithm and there is uncertainty about the algorithm itself. That is, 
the whole calculational scheme may be incorrect. It is apparently quite 
difficult to carry along these several sources of uncertainty and translate them 
intuitively into a 98% confidence band. Once the "best guess" is arrived at as 
an anchor (e.g. , the 900,000 figure above), the adjustments fail to do justice 
to the many ways in which this estimate could be in error. 
 
Another recent study by Tversky and Kahneman (1972) demonstrates quite 
nicely the fact that adjustments tend to be insufficient. They asked subjects 
almanac questions such as "What is the percentage of people in the U.S. today 
who are age 55 or older?" They gave the subjects starting percentages that were 
randomly chosen and asked the subjects to adjust these starting points until 
they reached their best estimate. Because of insufficient adjustment, those 
whose starting points were too high ended up with higher estimates than those 
who started with a value that was too low. 
 
An anchor serves the function of a register in which we store our first 
impressions or the results of our earlier calculations. Thus, anchoring is a 
natural strategy for easing the strain that information processing places upon 
our memory. Why adjustments from the anchor are typically insufficient is 
presently unclear. One possibility is that people stop adjusting too soon 
because they tire of the mental effort involved in adjusting. Another 
possibility is that the anchor point takes on a special salience and people feel 
that there is less risk in making estimates close to it than in deviating far 
from it. 
 
V. Are Important Decisions Biased? 
Experimental work, such as that just described, documents man's 
difficulties in weighing information and judging uncertainty. Do these  
difficulties persist outside the confines of the laboratory when the subject 
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resumes the task of using familiar sources of information to make decisions that 
are personally important to him? 
 
While there is little systematic evidence bearing on this question, there 
are reasons to believe that man's cognitive limitations will lead him to 
simplify the process of integrating information when making even the most 
important decisions. 
 
The first argument in support of this statement is based upon the pervasiveness 
of the evidence on cognitive biases, across a wide variety of tasks, where 
intelligent individuals served as subjects, often under conditions designed to 
maximize motivation and involvement. For example, the subjects studied by 
Tversky and Kahneman (197la) were scientists, highly trained in statistics, 
evaluating problems with which they were familiar. Likewise, Alpert and Raiffa 
(1968) found it extremely difficult to reduce the biased confidence intervals in 
their subjects who were students in the advanced management program at a leading 
graduate school. In many of the experiments reported above, extreme measures 
were taken to maximize the subjects' motivation to be unbiased. When 
Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) observed inconsistent patterns of choices and 
prices among college student subjects gambling for relatively small stakes, they 
repeated the study, with identical results, on the floor of a Las Vegas casino. 
It should be noted that their experiments involving selling price responses 
employed a rather elaborate procedure devised by Becker, De Groot, and Marschak 
(1964) to persuade the subject to report his true subjective value of the bet as 
his lowest selling price; any deviations from this strategy, any efforts to 
"beat the game," necessarily resulted in a game of lesser value to the subject 
than the game resulting when he honestly reported his subjective valuations. 
Tversky and Kahneman have also resorted to extreme measures to motivate their 
subjects to behave in an unbiased manner. The belief that man can behave 
optimally when it is worthwhile for him to do so gains little support from these 
studies. The sources of judgmental bias are cognitive, not motivational. They 
have a persistent quality not unlike that of perceptual illusions. 
 
Furthermore, there are some hints, at least, of the consequences of man's 
information-processing limitations in many important decision situations. For 
example, Kates (1962) and Burton and Kates (1964) present data showing that 
overly simple judgmental processes and misperception of the probabilistic nature 
of the environment contribute to massive losses due to floods and other natural 
hazards. Examination of business decisions and governmental policy making 
suggests that, whenever possible, decision makers avoid uncertainty and the 
necessity of weighting and combining information or integrating conflicting 
values. For example, Woods (1966, p. 95) summarizes his observations of one 
business firm's investment strategy as follows: 
 
"In estimating the value to their company 
of a potential investment, the managers in the 
organizations studied are preoccupied with searching 
for a comparable prior investment rather than iden- 
tifying the relevant variables and forecasting the 
underlying uncertainty. Uncertainty is avoided 
like the plague, while the certainty of historical 
information is accorded such a premium that it 
dominates the managers' mental processes completely." 
 
Cyert and March ( 1963, p. 120) have also written about the avoidance of 
uncertainty by business firms: 
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"Our studies, however, lead us to the propo- 
sition that firms will devise and negotiate an 
environment so as to eliminate the uncertainty. 
Rather than treat the environment as exogenous and 
to be predicted, they seek ways to make it controllable. 
 
". . . one conspicuous means of control is 
through the establishment of an industry-wide con- 
ventional practices. 
 
"For example, prices are frequently set on the 
basis of conventional practice. With time, such 
variables as the rate of mark-up, price lines, and 
standard costing procedures become customary within an 
industry. The net result of such activity . . . is 
that an uncertain environment is made quite highly 
predictable." 
 
Lindblom (1964) came to similar conclusions on the basis of his analysis 
of governmental policy making. He noted that administrators avoid the difficult 
task of taking all important factors into consideration and weighing their 
relative merits and drawbacks. Instead, they employ what he calls "the method of 
successive limited comparisons." This method simplifies decisions by comparing 
only those policies that differ in relatively small degree from policies already 
in effect. Thus it is not necessary to undertake fundamental inquiry into an 
alternative and its consequences: one need study only those respects in which 
the proposed alternative and its consequences differ from the status quo. 
 
The decision makers studied by Cyert and March and Lindblom were also found to 
avoid long-range planning and forecasting. They preferred to take small steps 
and to monitor short-run feedback rather than to try to predict the consequences 
of a long-range move. Quite often, it took a crisis to force them to make new 
decisions. The avoidance of uncertainty, the avoidance of "weighing relative 
merits and drawbacks," crisis orientation, and the avoidance of long-range 
forecasting are just what one would expect, given what the laboratory studies 
indicate about our cognitive limitations. 
 
The anchoring and adjustment mechanism that is so evident in experimental 
studies seems to crop up in many interesting real-world decisions as well. For 
example, a procedure frequently used by retail businessmen to set prices is to 
use the wholesale price of an item as an anchor and then add a fixed percentage 
mark-up to this base. In the area of budget making, it is common knowledge that 
the largest determining factor of the size of this year's budget is last year's 
budget, which essentially serves as an anchor. Wildavsky (1964, p. 15) makes the 
following comment: 
 
"Budgeting is incremental, not comprehensive. 
The beginning of wisdom about an agency budget is 
that it is almost never actively reviewed as a 
whole every year in the sense of reconsidering the 
value of all existing programs as compared to all 
possible alternatives. Instead, it is based on 
last year's budget with special attention given to 
a narrow range of increases or decreases. Thus the 
men who make the budget are concerned with relatively 
small increments to an existing base." 
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The anchoring and insufficient adjustment that Tversky and Kahneman observed 
with their almanac questions could well contribute to errors that plague 
projected cost estimates. For example, a recent congressional study team has 
noted that the cost of major weapons systems is running nearly 50% ahead of 
original estimates. In one case, the original estimate for 6 submarine rescue 
vehicles was l8 million dollars. The actual cost was close to 460 million  
dollars—a value that most certainly would have been viewed as impossible when 
the original estimates were made. This gigantic overrun, like many others, was 
blamed on a failure to foresee development problems. The moral seems to be that 
there are many ways our estimates can go wrong, and it is difficult to 
incorporate our uncertainty about these possible sources of error into our 
actual judgments. 
 
Finally, I'd like to point out a particularly painful example of anchoring 
and insufficient adjustment from my own experience. A few years ago a colleague 
and I agreed to write a chapter for a book. After the project was completed, we 
were rummaging through our correspondence with the book's editor and were rather 
dismayed to note the string of optimistic projections and broken promises that 
is illustrated below: 
 
History of the Chapter 
 
On this date:  We promised it for this date: 
 
Sept. 16, 1968   June 1969 
May 1969    end of July 1969 
Dec. 1969    end of Jan. 1970 
Jan. 1970    April 1970 
April 1970    end of June 1970 
 
But we finally sent 
the first draft:   July 24, 1970 
 
I'm sure many of you have had the same experience and we can take some small 
comfort in a study by Kidd (1970) showing that a similar thing happens when the 
Central Electricity Generating Board in England and Wales attempts to estimate 
how long it will take to overhaul its equipment. 
 
VI. Some Concluding Comments 
I'd like to conclude with some speculations about the implications of 
research on human cognitive limitations. Although the paper began with a quote 
from Shakespeare, Francis Bacon was perhaps more foresightful. He said, "We do 
ill to exalt the powers of the human mind, when we should seek out its proper 
helps." The research I've been describing certainly documents the urgent need 
for such proper helps, or decision aids as they are now called, but it also 
indicates that the development of such aids will not necessarily come easily. 
For example, the key element of many suggested procedures for aiding decision 
making is their emphasis on decomposing a decision problem into a number of more 
elementary problems. The decision maker is asked questions about specific 
probabilities and utilities and his subjective judgments form the input to a 
normative model which then tells him what decision to follow. But what is the 
best method of assessing these probabilities and utilities? We have observed 
that serious biases can creep into even the most elementary judgments. Knowing 
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how these biases operate, however, will undoubtedly help us determine the most 
unbiased ways to elicit the decision maker's knowledge and beliefs. 
 
It is interesting to speculate about why we have such great confidence in our 
intuitive judgments, in the light of the deficiencies that emerge when they are 
exposed to scientific scrutiny. For one thing, our basic perceptual motor skills 
are remarkably good, the product of a long period of evolution, and thus we can 
process sensory information with remarkable ease. This may fool us into thinking 
that we can process conceptual information with similar facility. Anyone who 
tries to predict where a baseball will land by calculating its impact against 
the bat, trajectory of flight, etc. will quickly realize that his analytic 
skills are inferior to his perceptual-motor abilities. Another reason for our 
confidence is that the world is structured in such a complex, multiply-
determined way that we can usually find some reason for our failures, other than 
our inherent inadequacies—bad luck is a particularly good excuse in a 
probabilistic world. In many situations we get little or no feedback about the 
results of our decisions and, in other instances, the criterion for judging our 
decisions is sufficiently vague that we can't tell how poorly we are actually 
doing. Finally, when we do make a mistake and recognize it as such, we often 
have the opportunity to take corrective action—thus, we may move from crisis to 
crisis but, in between crises, we have periods of fairly effective functioning.  
 
Man has faced decisions of great consequence, like those involving nuclear 
energy, only within his recent history. It might be argued that he has not had 
enough opportunity to evolve an intellect capable of dealing conceptually with 
information and uncertainty. He is essentially a trial-and-error learner and 
there is little evidence that he can change his ways even when errors will be 
quite costly (see, for example, Schrader, 1971). How does such a creature learn 
by experience, yet avoid catastrophe? A pessimist might advise him to take very 
small steps—small enough so that he can recover from the inevitable 
miscalculations. An optimist would reply that the technology of decision making 
will undoubtedly advance rapidly within the next decade. Perhaps an awareness of 
our limitations, coupled with sophisticated methods of decision analysis, will 
enable us to minimize many of the judgmental biases discussed in this paper. 
 
I'm an optimist. 
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Notes 
This is a revised version of a paper presented at a symposium entitled 
"Multi-Attribute Preference Theory and Its Applications," XIX International 
Meeting of the Institute of Management Sciences, Houston, Texas, April 5, 1972. 
 
The writing of this paper was supported by Grant MH-12972 from the 
National Institute of Mental Health and by Grant GS-32505 from the National 
Science Foundation. The author is indebted to Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky 
for permission to describe some of their unpublished data and for their many 
helpful comments on the general presentation. 
 
1. People are not always incautious when drawing inferences from samples 
of data. Under somewhat different circumstances they become quite conservative, 
responding as though data are much less diagnostic than they truly are (see 
Edwards, 1968). 
 
2. Considerable effort was made to insure that the selling prices, like 
the choices, reflected only the attractiveness of the gambles and not extraneous 
motivational factors. For details, see the reports of the experiments. 
 
From Shakespeare to Simon  Page 19 
DUPLEX GAMBLE
WIN 0
WIN $2
LOSE 0
WIN $2
VARIANCE OF DUPLEX BET = pq (A2+B2) = .24 (22 + 22) = 1.92
VARIANCE OF STANDARD BET = pq (A–B)2 = .24 (2+2)2 = 3.84
Figure 1. Comparison between parallel duplex and 
standard gambles.
STANDARD GAMBLE
LOSE $2
WIN $2
DUPLEX GAMBLE A
WIN 0
Figure 2. Comparison between pairs of duplex gambles by
Payne and Braunstein.
WIN 40¢
LOSE 0
LOSE 40¢
DUPLEX GAMBLE B
WIN 40¢
LOSE 0
LOSE 40¢
WIN 0
 
